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JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OVER THE INTERSTATE
PLACEMENT OF FOSTER CHILDREN: THE MISSING
ELEMENT IN CURRENT EFFORTS TO REFORM THE
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF
CHILDREN
VIVEK SANKARAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC or
Compact), a uniform state law governing the interstate placement of
children in foster care,' is under attack. Policymakers, academics, and
advocates have criticized the statutory scheme for being unworkable and
unnecessarily impeding children's permanent placement with their parents
or relatives.2  Judges, frustrated with delays in the interstate placement
Copyright © 2009, Vivek Sankaran
* Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (2006). See infra notes 4-8 and accompanying text, for a brief
discussion of the ICPC.
2 See, e.g., Madelyn D. Freundlich, Reforming the Interstate Compact on the Placement
of Children: A New Framework for Interstate Adoption, 4 HYBRID 15, 30-31 (1997)
(recognizing that outcomes for children under the ICPC "have been at best troubling, and at
worst dire"); Julius Libow, The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children-A
Critical Analysis, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 19, 19 (1992) ("[T]he Compact itself becomes the
problem, not the solution and at times endangers the well-being of children."); John C. Lore
III, Protecting Abused, Neglected, and Abandoned Children: A Proposal for Provisional
Out-of-State Kinship Placements Pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children, 40 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 57, 57 (2006) (addressing "the critical need for reform
of the Interstate Compact"); Vivek S. Sankaran, Perpetuating the Impermanence of Foster
Children: A Critical Analysis of Efforts to Reform the Interstate Compact on the Placement
of Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 435, 444 (2006) [hereinafter Perpetuating Impermanence] ("[The
ICPC] has created a system in which foster children awaiting interstate placements languish
in temporary placements indefinitely."); Vivek S. Sankaran, Out of State and Out of Luck:
The Treatment of Non-Custodial Parents Under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 63, 67 (2006) [hereinafter Out of Luck] ("[Tlhe current
application of the ICPC violates the constitutional and custodial rights of parents and
increases the likelihood that children will unnecessarily remain in foster care."); Letter from
Center for Family Representation to Jerry Friedman (Mar. 10, 2008) (on file with author).
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process, have found creative ways to avoid strict compliance with the law.3
In 2006, the federal government intervened and enacted legislation to
expedite the completion of interstate home studies and mandate that each
state assess its interstate placement procedures.4 Recently, state child
welfare agencies, under the leadership of the American Public Human
Services Association, drafted a proposal to reform the ICPC, which is
currently being introduced in state legislatures across the country.5 A
consensus has emerged that the current system is flawed and needs a
massive overhaul.6 Preserving the status quo is not an option.
Yet, notably absent from the current debate on reforming the ICPC is
any consideration of creating judicial oversight over the interstate
placement process, which has been absent since it was drafted in 1960.
Under the Compact, the child welfare agency in the state in which the
proposed caretaker resides has the exclusive authority over placement
3 See, e.g., N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. K.F., 803 A.2d 721, 728-29 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (finding the ICPC inapplicable to placements of foster children
with relatives); Crystal A. v. Lisa B., 818 N.Y.S.2d 443, 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (holding
the ICPC inapplicable where grandparents filed a separate custody action regarding foster
children); State of Fla., Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. Thornton, 396 S.E.2d 475,
481 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that the best interests of the child trumps strict compliance with
the Compact); see also ARK. SUPREME COURT AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON FOSTER CARE AND
ADOPTION, ARKANSAS COURT IMPROVEMENT INTERSTATE PLACEMENT OF FOSTER CHILDREN
ASSESSMENT REPORT 41, 63 (2008) [hereinafter ARK. COURT IMPROVEMENT REPORT],
available at http://www.abanet.org/child/rclji/placementassessments/AR icpc assessment.
pdf (reporting that 72% ofjudges have entered a custody order for an out-of-state placement
and terminated jurisdiction to avoid compliance with the ICPC).
4 § 671(a).
5 See AM. PUB. HUMAN SERVS. ASs'N, ASS'N OF ADMINISTRATORS OF THE INTERSTATE
COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE FOR THE
NEW ICPC, http://www.aphsa.org/Policy/ICPC-REWRITE/Proposed%20Legslative%20
Language/PROPOSEDLEGISLATIVELANGUAGE09.pdf [hereinafter NEW ICPC]. See
Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children,
http://icpc.aphsa.org/Home/homenews.asp (last visited Aug. 27, 2009), for more
information about efforts of the American Public Human Services Association to reform the
Compact.
6 See Erik Eckholm, Waits Plague Transfers of Children to Relatives' Care, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2008, at Al 1; Megan O'Matz & Sally Kestin, Foster Kids Get Lost in Out-
of-State Paperwork, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 16, 2002, at B5; Megan O'Matz & Sally
Kestin, Children Lost Despite Pact Among States; Cumbersome Placement Process Fails,
S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 9, 2002, at IA; Rita Price, Couple Fights for Abused
Grandson, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 17, 2009, at Al.
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decisions, which are based on its determination of whether the placement is
"contrary to the child's interests." 7 If that agency denies the placement, the
statute explicitly prohibits courts from reviewing and overturning the
agency's determination.
8
Consider the following illustrative example. A child in Michigan is
removed from his mother's care and placed in a temporary foster home.
The child's grandmother, who lives in Tennessee, requests immediate
custody of the child. All parties to the case agree that the placement is in
the child's best interest, but under the Compact, the juvenile court judge
cannot make the placement until the Tennessee child welfare agency
makes a determination that the placement is not contrary to the child's
interest, a process that may take months if not years. 9 If the Tennessee
agency refuses to grant approval, the denial acts as an absolute veto of the
placement, even if that agency's decision is arbitrary, subjective, or
capricious.10  The ICPC explicitly bars any judicial review of the
decision. 1  Despite the well-documented problems in the interstate
placement process-lengthy delays in the completion of home studies,
subjective decision-making, and inadequate due process protections-this
system has persisted for over forty years.
This article argues that current efforts to reform the Compact are
flawed because they lack an essential element: judicial oversight of agency
decision-making. The first section explores the important role that juvenile
7 INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN art. III(d), reprinted in AM.
Pun. HUMAN SERVS. ASS'N, GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF
CHILDREN 10-11 (2002), http://icpc.aphsa.org/Home/Doc/Guidebook_2002.pdf [hereinafter
GUIDE TO THE ICPC].
8 See NEW ICPC, supra note 5, at art. VI(B) (stating that an agency's determination to
deny placement "is not subject to judicial review").
9 See Jon S. v. Dept. of Health and Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 212 P.3d
756, 771 (Alaska 2009) (describing a placement that took nearly two years to complete);
see also Lore, supra note 2, at 73 (citing problems with the Compact, including "excessive
time required to complete the placement process [and] delays in placement due to differing
state adoption laws"). The importance of timely decision-making in child welfare cases
cannot be understated. See Hon. Leonard P. Edwards, Achieving Timely Permanency in
Child Protection Courts: The Case for Frontloading the Court Process, 58 Juv. & FAm. CT.
J. 1 (2007), for more information about reforms to expedite permanency for children.
1o See Out of Luck, supra note 2, at 70 ("[A]rbitrary decisions by caseworkers are
immune from judicial review, because the ICPC prohibits a court from overturning those
decisions.").
1 NEW ICPC, supra note 5, at art. VI(B).
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court judges play in making placement decisions for foster children. Next,
an examination of the current problems in the interstate placement process
demonstrates the vital need for judicial oversight of the system. Finally, a
specific proposal is put forth on how best to incorporate judicial oversight
without interfering with the sovereignty of states.
II. THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Child welfare agencies across the country are in disarray. Primarily
staffed by overworked and underpaid caseworkers with little prior
experience or training in child welfare, 2 few agencies have demonstrated
the ability to adequately meet the needs of foster children under their
purview.' 3  Stories documenting the failures of these agencies are
pervasive. Children in foster care remain missing for months.
14
Caseworkers overlook signs of child maltreatment in foster homes. 5
Families involved in the system complain of going months without seeing
a caseworker.1 6  Not surprisingly, outcomes for children raised by the
12 Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and
the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 106 (1997).
13 See THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, THE UNSOLVED CHALLENGE OF SYSTEM
REFORM: THE CONDITION OF THE FRONTLINE HUMAN SERVICES WORKFORCE 41 (2003)
(observing that the annual turnover rate in the child welfare workforce is 20% for public
agencies and 40% for private agencies); Sandra Stukes Chipungu & Tricia B. Bent-
Goodley, Meeting the Challenges of Contemporary Foster Care, 14 FUTURE OF CHILD. 75,
83 (2004) (noting that 90% of state child welfare agencies report difficulty in recruiting and
retaining workers); Weinstein, supra note 12, at 106 (observing that many child welfare
workers have "never actually received graduate or even undergraduate training in the field
of social work"); Sari Horwitz & Scott Higham, Foster Care Caseload "Just Horrible,"
WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2000, at Al (noting that child welfare agencies are generally
understaffed and undertrained).
14 See, e.g., Jack Kresnak, Michigan Agency Loses 302 Children, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Aug. 30, 2002, available at http://www.fightcps.com/2002_08_25_archive.html.
15 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (documenting an instance
where a child died after the state child welfare agency failed to conduct an adequate
investigation); Richard Lezin Jones, New Jersey Failed Basic Checks as Boys Starved, A
Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at Al; John Sullivan & Craig R. McCoy, Report
Shows How DHS Failed, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 1, 2007, available at
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/special/childwelfare/20070601_Reportshows_how_DHS
_failed.html (describing a state report that found that children needlessly died because of
systemic failures).
16 Rene Stutzman, More Than 70 Florida Caseworkers Lied About Efforts to Protect
Children, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jul. 13, 2009, available at http://www.pantagraph.com/
(continued)
388 [38:385
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foster care system can be abysmal.17 These and other inadequacies have
resulted in the entry of numerous consent decrees granting federal courts
the power to manage state child welfare agencies.'
8
The disrepair of the executive branch in handling child welfare matters
has increased the involvement of the judiciary to manage the process.
Although the creation of juvenile courts dates back to the early twentieth
century,19 court involvement in child welfare cases substantially increased
after the passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
(AACWA) of 1980, which was enacted due to Congress' concern that "too
many children were entering the nation's foster care system, that they
remained in the system too long and that too little effort was being made
either to reunite foster children with their families of origin or to free them
for adoption., 20 The AACWA increased judicial involvement by making
federal funding of child welfare systems contingent on court review of
agency decision-making. 2' For example, the AACWA mandated regular
court reviews and required judges to make numerous written findings,
including whether the agency made "reasonable efforts" to maintain
children in their homes.22 The judiciary's important role was reaffirmed in
news/article_c68d218e-6f52-1 1de-9e38-001cc4c03286.html (describing examples of
caseworkers falsifying reports about their supposed inspection of homes).
17 See WESTAT, INC., A NATIONAL EVALUATION OF TITLE IV-E FOSTER CARE
INDEPENDENT LiviNG PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH, PHASE 2: FINAL REPORT xvi (1991) (stating
that many foster children end up in jail or public assistance, or otherwise represent an
economic cost to society after exiting the foster care system); Robin Erb, Children Who Age
Out of Foster Care Often Have Tough Life Ahead, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 30, 2008,
available at http://www.freep.com/article/20081130/SPEC1AL0L/811250425/1280.
18 See ChildrensRights.org, Children's Rights Goes to Court to Fight for Children's
Fundamental Rights to Be Protected from Harm-And to Grow up in Loving, Permanent
Homes, http://www.childrensrights.org/reform-campaigns/legal-cases (last visited Nov. 4,
2009) (listing active, pre-judgment cases in Oklahoma and Rhode Island, listing active
cases in which court-ordered settlements or judgments are being monitored and enforced in
eight states, and listing six closed cases that have been completed successfully in six states).
19 See Marvin Ventrell, The History of Child Welfare, in CHILD WELFARE LAW &
PRACTICE 132 (Donald N. Duquette & Marvin Ventrell eds., 2005).
20 See Miriam Rollin et al., Federal Child Welfare Law and Policy: Understanding the
Federal Law and Funding Process, in CHILD WELFARE LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 19, at
151.
21 id
22 See id. at 145, 152-57.
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subsequent amendments to the AACWA captured in the Adoption and Safe
Families Act (ASFA) of 1997.23
The increased responsibilities of juvenile courts did not end with the
changes required by federal law. In recent years, a new movement has
emerged, calling for a proactive juvenile court to protect the interests of
children. Forced to fix both broken agencies and broken families, judges
across the country have advocated for a new conception of the juvenile
court judge, who not only resolves disputes, but also leads the problem-
solving team.24 As the leader of the team, the judge oversees all aspects of
the case and enters orders to ensure "that the system as a whole functions
as well as it can., 25 This role "entails oversight that extends well beyond
placing a child in foster care to including that children in out-of-home care
receive the safety, permanence, and well-being promised them in federal
and state law."26 Significant reforms such as the emergence of unified
23 Id.
24 See Hon. Leonard P. Edwards, The Juvenile Court and the Role of the Juvenile Court
Judge, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 1 (1992); see also Bruce J. Winick, Problem Solving Courts
and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1055 (2003) ("Recently, a
range of new kinds of problems, many of which are social and psychological in nature, have
appeared before the courts. These cases require the courts ... to attempt to solve a variety
of human problems that are responsible for bringing the case to court....").
25 Judith S. Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at
How Courts Are Run, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 851, 862 (1997) ("[T]he court is no longer a remote
adjudicator but is heading a problem-solving team . . . . [T]he court will be taking a
leadership role in seeing that all the players... work together so that the system as a whole
functions as well as it can."); see also Winick, supra note 24, at 1060 ("Not only is the
judge the leading actor in the therapeutic drama, ... the judge also assumes the role of
director, coordinating the roles of... the actors, providing a needed motivation of how they
will play their parts, and inspiring them to play them well.").
26 THE PEW COMMISSION ON CHILDREN AND FOSTER CARE, FOSTERING THE FUTURE:
SAFETY, PERMANENCE AND WELL-BEING FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 34 (2006),
available at http://pewfostercare.org/research/docs/FinalReport.pdf; Note, Unified Family
Courts and the Child Protection Dilemma, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2099, 2109 (2003) ("[T]he
[Unified Family Court] judge has a pretrial responsibility to direct the case by identifying
the relevant issues, parties, and outcome goals .... [T]he judge is at once a mediator,
negotiator, and planner, in addition to an adjudicator."); Richard Boldt & Jana Singer,
Juristrocacy in the Trenches: Problem-Solving Judges and Therapeutic Jurisprudence in
Drug Treatment and Unified Family Courts, 65 MD. L. REv. 82, 93 (2006) ("Family court
judges no longer function primarily as fault-finders or rights adjudicators but rather as
ongoing conflict managers .... [T]he court assume[es] direct responsibility for children's
well-being rather than serving as a passive arbiter of disputes between adult claimants.");
(continued)
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family courts, "drug courts," and "baby courts" have all expanded the
authority of the judge. 27 At the core of these initiatives is the belief that an
active and involved judiciary is needed to provide the leadership and
accountability necessary to ensure that good decision-making occurs. This
broad conception of the judge's role stands in stark contrast with the non-
existent role judges play when an interstate placement is sought.
Robust judicial monitoring of agency decision-making continues to be
necessary for a myriad of reasons. As noted above, the unfortunate reality
is that child welfare procedures are often conducted by young,
inexperienced workers who lack specialized training and carry high
caseloads.28 Caseworkers generally do not have the time to meet with
families or conduct comprehensive investigations. 29  Families regularly
voice concerns about their inability to contact caseworkers, engage in
meaningful conversations with them, or have their evidence considered.3°
Once caseworkers complete an investigation, they must often make very
subjective determinations based on amorphous standards such as "the best
interests of the child.",31 Racial and cultural biases often seep into the
Winick, supra note 24, at 1060 ("The new problem solving courts are all characterized by
active judicial involvement, and the explicit use of judicial authority to motivate individuals
to accept needed services and to monitor their compliance and progress.").
27 See Unified Family Courts and the Child Protection Dilemma, supra note 26, 2103-
04 (2003) ("By 1998, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia had established or
planned for some type of specialized court to handle family law matters."); Boldt, supra
note 26, at 98 (describing 2003 survey that found more than 1600 problem-solving court
programs operating in all fifty states and the District of Columbia).
28 See Weinstein supra note 12, at 106.
29 See THE CHILD WELFARE POLICY AND PRACTICE GROUP, IMPROVING CHILD WELFARE
2 (2001), available at www.childwelfaregroup.org/documents/FlaLegis.doc.
30 See Jane 0. Hansen, Georgia's Forgotten Children: States Child Case Workers
Among Lowest-Paid in Nation, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Feb. 6, 2000, available
at http://www.gahsc.org/terrell/salaries3.html ("National child welfare agencies recommend
that no caseworker carry more than 17 cases. What is known, however, is that in Georgia,
some child protective caseworkers carry as many as 60 families at a time.").
31 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 45 n.13 (1981) (observing that the
Supreme Court "more than once has adverted to the fact that the 'best interests of the child'
standard offers little guidance to judges, and may effectively encourage them to rely on
their own personal values"); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Mass. 1999)
(conceding that the best interests standard is "somewhat amorphous"); Henry H. Foster, Jr.,
Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child?, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973)
(noting that the best interests standard is an "amorphous concept which may serve as a basis
for rationalization of any result"); Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best
(continued)
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decision-making and caseworkers may make choices based on formal
policies and procedures, rather than individualized determinations.32 Once
they make a decision, a neutral party has few opportunities to review that
decision.33 Providing caseworkers with unbridled discretion to make those
decisions only increases the likelihood of an erroneous determination.34
Judicial review, though imperfect, provides an opportunity to enhance
the quality of decision-making. Generally speaking, decisions are best
reached after a deliberative process that encourages participation, relies on
the most accurate information, and provides a mechanism to review
potentially erroneous decisions.35 This is precisely what the judicial
system is designed to do.
Interests of the Child Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 373
(2008) (acknowledging that the best interests decision making process is "relatively
unbridled" and "thoroughly subjective").
32 In recent years, a number of reports have been issued documenting racial biases
present in child welfare decision-making, which has contributed to the disproportional
presence of Aflican-American children in the foster care system. See generally ROBERT
HILL, CAsEY-CSSP ALLIANCE FOR RACIAL EQUITY, SYNTHEsIs ON DISPROPORTIONALITY IN
CHILD WELFARE (2006), available at http://www.racemattersconsortium.org/docs/
BobHillPaperFINAL.pdf; DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE (2002).
33 See Unified Family Courts and the Child Protection Dilemma, supra note 26, at 2111
("Those who recognize these risks but ultimately support UFCs suggest possible
safeguards, such as review by another judge or use of different judges for the factfinding
and disposition phases of a case.").
34 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967) ("Departures from established principles of due
process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness.").
31 See id. at 21 ("It is these instruments of due process which enhance the possibility
that truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions and conflicting data.
Procedure is to law what scientific method is to science.") (internal citation omitted); Idaho
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990) ("The theory of the hearsay rule... is that the many
possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness which may lie underneath the bare
untested assertion of a witness can best be brought to light and exposed, if they exist, by the
test of cross-examination.") (quoting 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1420 (Chadboume rev.
1974)); Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283 n.7 (1989) ("The age-old tool for ferreting out
truth in the trial process is the right to cross-examination. For two centuries past, the policy
of the Anglo-American system of evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by
cross-examination as a vital feature of the law.") (quoting 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) ("In almost every setting where important
decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses.").
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Prior to court hearings, parties conduct independent investigations to
uncover facts relevant to the presenting issue. During the hearing, each
side presents the information to a neutral arbiter-the judge-and is given
the opportunity to challenge the other side's information either by
objecting to its admissibility or by cross-examining witnesses.36 The
participants are given the chance to present arguments as to why a
particular decision must be reached pursuant to the applicable law.37 The
judge then renders a decision after considering all opinions and balancing
various harms.38 Parties dissatisfied with the process are given the chance
to have the decision reviewed on appeal.39 These basic procedures, which
lie at the heart of the American conception of due process,40 do not occur
when an agency is given complete, unreviewable decision-making
authority.
Judicial review is also crucial to safeguard the basic constitutional
rights of families. Child welfare proceedings implicate the fundamental
liberty interests of parents and children.4' Parents possess a right to direct
the upbringing of their children and the state bears the burden of proving
parental unfitness prior to infringing upon that right.42 Children also share
an interest in preventing the erroneous separation of the family,43 and if
36 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270 ("[W]here governmental action seriously injures an
individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used
to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an
opportunity to show that it is untrue.") (quoting Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97
(1959)).
37 Id. at 269.
38 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987) ("[A] court must
balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the
granting or withholding of the requested relief.").
39 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972).
40 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967).
41 The Supreme Court has long recognized the fundamental rights of parents to make
decisions regarding the upbringing of their children. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as
an enduring American tradition.").
42 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) ("[A]s a matter of due process of law,
[the father] was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken
from him....").
43 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) ("[T]he child and his parents share a
vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.").
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they are placed in state custody, they have a heightened constitutional right
to be free from physical, psychological, and emotional harm, which courts
have interpreted to include the right to maintain relationships with family
members. 44
Without close judicial oversight of agency decision-making,
constitutional violations are likely. United States Supreme Court Justice
Louis Brandeis cautioned that "[e]xperience should teach us to be most on
our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are
beneficent .... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
'4 5
The practices of child welfare agencies have certainly corroborated Justice
Brandeis' observations. Stories abound of children unjustly removed from
their parents' custody or children denied basic rights by state agencies
responsible for caring for them. 46 These intrusions, infringing upon the
constitutional rights of parents and children, are often rationalized by the
need to protect children despite having little support in the law. Judges,
who are trained to safeguard constitutional rights and whose discretion is
limited by due process protections, are in the best position to prevent the
state from overreaching into the protected realm of the family.
"See, e.g., Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that
children in foster care have a constitutional right to be protected from harm by the State,
including harm created by the State's failure to place them with family); LaShawn A. v.
Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 993 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that a foster child has a due process
right to be free from psychological harm and, where necessary to safeguard against such
harm, a right to "appropriate placements and case planning" by child welfare agencies);
Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1009-10 (N.D. I11. 1989) (noting that a foster
child's right to be free from psychological harm could be infringed where the child is
restricted access to family members).
45 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).
46 See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (issuing
a preliminary injunction that prevented the city from removing children from battered
mothers who were fit to retain custody of their children solely because the mothers were
battered); State ex rel. A.T., 936 So. 2d 79, 85-86 (La. 2006) (reversing a lower court's
termination of parental rights after finding that child protective services provided "no
rehabilitative services" to the removed child or the child's parent); In re James G., 943 A.2d
53, 86 (Md. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that child protective services failed to provide
reasonable vocational assistance prior to terminating a father's parental rights); Brian
Dickerson, Hard Lemonade, Hard Price, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 28, 2008, at Al; Petula
Dvorak, Child Deaths Lead to Excessive Foster Care Placements, Critics Say, WASH. POST,
Jan. 8, 2009, at B4.
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This section's intent is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of why
judicial involvement in child welfare cases is essential. Instead, the
purpose is to provide a basic overview of the main reasons why a system
permitting judicial review is desirable and why a system lacking such
review should raise concerns. The concerns noted above are only
exacerbated in the interstate placement context because the child welfare
agency, possessing unbridled discretion, has no incentive to act in a
manner that prioritizes the interests of families. The receiving state agency
is not invested in the case and does not form a close relationship with the
child or parents. If that agency conducts a timely home study, thoroughly
considers all of the relevant evidence, recognizes the constitutional rights
of parents and children, and expedites the placement of children with their
families, then, in all likelihood, more children will enter its jurisdiction.
This, in turn, will trigger oversight responsibilities, which will burden an
already overwhelmed caseworker who has many other duties. The family
may also request public benefits, such as medical and educational services,
which will cost the state a considerable amount of money. Few states have
an incentive to ensure that the process runs efficiently.
In contrast, if the agency arbitrarily denies the placement or refuses to
complete a home study in a timely manner, it will face few consequences.
No entity has the authority to impose sanctions on that agency, and the fear
that other states will retaliate by arbitrarily denying placements is far too
speculative and remote because it has never occurred. States deal with
one another on a broad range of issues and the importance of this one issue
likely ranks low on the list of priorities. The structure described above
demonstrates the incentives for states to deny placements, which provide
additional reasons why judicial oversight is crucial.
The most persuasive evidence justifying the need for judicial review
lies in examining the results of a system-the interstate placement of foster
children-which has operated without any such review for over forty
years. Close scrutiny of this system demonstrates why judicial oversight
must play a key role in any effort to reform the ICPC. The next section
addresses this issue.
47 See NEW ICPC, supra note 5, at art. IV (stating there is a penalty available for illegal
placement of children outside the ICPC, but no authority is given to penalize a receiving
state agency's lack of due diligence or timeliness).
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III. THE EFFECTS OF UNBRIDLED AGENCY DECISION-MAKING
For the past forty years, the ICPC has prohibited any judicial oversight
over the interstate placement of foster children.48 Judges cannot compel
another state to complete a home study, 49 expedite the completion of the
assessment, 0 or place a child in the other state if the child welfare agency
in the receiving state disapproves the placement, regardless of what others
in the case believe is best for the child.51 In this scheme, agencies have
unfettered discretion to do as they please. No consequences occur if the
agencies choose to exercise their authority in an erroneous or arbitrary
manner.
52
What has transpired in this system is precisely what one would expect
in a system of voluntary compliance lacking any judicial oversight. The
first step in the interstate placement process is that the sending state-the
state proposing to place the child in another state-must request that the
receiving state conduct a home study.13 Although a juvenile court can
order the sending state to submit a request for the home study, it has no
authority to compel the other state to actually complete it.54 Whether a
state completes a home study and if so, how quickly it is done, is entirely
up to the other state.5 Voluntary guidelines drafted by the American
Public Human Services Association, which administers the Compact,
recommend that states complete home studies within thirty days.56
Timely home studies, however, are rarely completed. State Compact
Administrators report that home studies routinely take at least three to four
months to complete; others have reported that it takes between six months
48 Secretariat Opinion 43, reprinted in AMER. PUB. HUMAN SERVS. ASS'N, COMPACT
ADMIN. MAUAL (Mar. 12, 1981) [hereinafter COMPACT ADMIfN. MANUAL] ("[E]ven if the
State A court disagrees with the determination of the receiving state Compact Administrator
with respect to the making of a placement in the receiving state, the court does not have the
jurisdiction or the power to act contrary to it.").
49 See NEW ICPC, supra note 5, at arts. III, IV, & IV; Secretariat Opinion 43, supra note
48.
50 Secretariat Opinion 43, reprinted in COMPACT ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 48.
51 Id.
52 id.
13 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(26) (2006); GUIDE TO TM ICPC, supra note 7, at 6-7; see also
Interstate Compact Replacement Request, ICPC-100A, reprinted in GUIDE TO THE ICPC,
supra note 7, at 28-29.
54 See NEW ICPC, supra note 5, at arts. III, IV, & V.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 7.
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and a year, if not longer.17  Recent findings from federally-mandated
assessment reports corroborate anecdotal evidence. For example, 57% of
interstate home studies requested by Arkansas were not completed within
sixty days.58 Of the home studies exceeding the time limit, approximately
a quarter were completed within seventy-five days, while the remaining
cases took longer.59 Of those exceeding seventy-five days, the average
time to completion was 110 days.60 The greatest time to completion was
448 days.6'
Arkansas fared no better in completing home studies requested by
other states. Of the home studies completed by the state, 70% were not
completed within sixty days.62 Of the home studies exceeding the time
limit, only 20% were done within seventy-five days.63 Of those exceeding
seventy-five days, the average time to completion was 176 days.64 The
longest home study took 558 days to complete.65
These findings are representative of those made by nearly every state
assessing its interstate placement process. Fifty-five percent of home
studies requested by Vermont took longer than three months.66  Sixty
57 BRUCE BOYER, REPORT TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 7 (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2003/joumal/l 18.pdf ("As a result of all of the problems
associated with the Compact, what should take days or weeks to accomplish often takes
months or, at times, over a year while children wait in temporary out-of-home placements
for the adults in charge of their futures to fulfill their professional obligations."); see also
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN: IMPLEMENTATION 6 (1999)
(reporting that state Compact administrators wait an average of three to four months for the
entire home study to be completed); A.A. v. Cleburne, 912 So. 2d 261 (Ala. Ct. App. 2005)
(relying on information that a social worker's belief that ICPC home study would take a
minimum of nine months to complete); Libow, supra note 2, at 22 (observing that the ICPC
approval process frequently takes between six months and a year and at times has exceeded
one year).
58 ARK. COURT IMPROVEMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
59 Id.6
°Id
61 Id.
62 Id. at47.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 VT. COURT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, VERMONT'S INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COURT'S ROLE IN EXPEDITING THE
(continued)
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percent of home studies conducted by Alaska took over sixty days to
finish.67 Almost 40% of home studies requested by Maine took over three
months.68 The lengthy delays in the process have drawn the criticism of
national child advocacy organizations, including the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges, the American Bar Association, the
National Association of Counsel for Children, and the American Academy
of Adoption Attorneys.69 Yet, because the Compact strips judges of the
authority to compel child welfare agencies to complete interstate home
studies in a timely manner,70 only the benevolence of child welfare
agencies can expedite the completion of home studies. The above data
suggests that this has not occurred.
A second problem directly related to the lack of judicial oversight lies
in the erroneous denial of home studies by receiving state agencies. Under
the Compact, once a home study is completed, the child welfare agencies
in the receiving state have the sole authority to determine whether to
approve or deny a placement under a very subjective legal standard.7' The
Compact instructs agencies to reject a placement if the placement appears
to be "contrary to the interests of the child. 72 No formal assessment
standards exist, and no distinction is made if the proposed placement is
intended to be with a parent or a relative.73 For all types of placements, the
agency has broad authority to approve or reject placements with no judicial
INTERSTATE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN 7 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/
child/rclji/placementassessmentsNTicpcassessment.pdf.
67 ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, CINA ICPC ASSESSMENT 3 (2008), available at
http://www.abanet.org/child/rclji/placementassessments/AK icpcassessment.pdf.
68 STATE OF MAINE, MAINE ASSESSMENT: INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF
CHILDREN 15 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/child/rclji/placementassessments
/ME-icpcassessment.pdf.
69 SUSAN LIVINGSTON SMITH, EvAN P. DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE,
SAFEGUARDING INTERSTATE ADOPTIONS: THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF
CHILDREn (2005), available at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/publications/2005_Brief
_SafeguardingInterstate Adoptions%20_April.pdf; Vivek S. Sankaran, Navigating the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children: Advocacy Tips for Child Welfare
Attorneys, 27 A.B.A. CHILD L. PRAC. 33, 40 (2008).
70 See NEW ICPC, supra note 5, at art. VI(B) (stating that an agency's determination to
deny placement "is not subject to judicial review").
71 See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
72 See NEW ICPC, supra note 5, at art. III(d).
71 Id. at art. III(d).
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oversight.74 In many instances, judges are not even provided copies of the
interstate home studies."
Data suggest that agencies may be misusing this power. A high
percentage of home studies are requested for placements of children with
their parents and relatives-individuals whose relationship with the
children receive some constitutional protection.76 Yet a surprisingly large
number of these interstate placement requests are rejected. For example, in
Arkansas, approximately 50% of home study requests made to other states
were denied." Arkansas itself denied over 70% of the home studies it
completed. 78  Similarly, Michigan denied 40% of all home studies it
completed and its requests were denied in 50% of all cases. 79 Again, these
statistics typify the practices of child welfare agencies across the country.
Data revealing the precise reasons for home study denials is not kept.
Thus, it is impossible to know exactly why state agencies have used their
unbridled discretion to reject such a significant number of placements of
children with their out-of-state parents and relatives. However, anecdotal
evidence reported by advocates across the country reveals a disturbing
pattern of arbitrary decision-making. 80 For example, a birth mother in
Alabama was rejected as a placement for her child because she was in a
relationship with a man who had a criminal conviction seventeen years
prior.81 A father in Texas was deprived of the opportunity to raise his childbecause of his conviction for armed robbery fifteen years prior.82 Spanish-
speaking relatives of a child were denied the ability to care for children
because they refused to participate in parenting classes, which were only
74 See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
75 See ARK. COURT IMPROVEMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 42 (reporting that 55% of
judges never received ICPC home study reports); see also ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
COURTS, CALIFORNIA'S INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN (ICPC)
ASSESSMENT 3 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/child/rclji/placement_
assessments/CA icpc assessment.pdf (noting that judges frequently felt limited by their
lack of information in ICPC cases).
76 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
77 ARK. COURT IMPROVEMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
781Id. at47.
79 See STATE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN: MICHIGAN ASSESSMENT 33 (2008), available at http://www.
abanet.org/child/rclji/placementassessments/MIicpc-assessment.pdf.
80 These accounts are documented in emails on file with the author.
81 id.
82 id.
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offered in English.83 Denials in other cases have been based on subjective
determinations, such as a lack of acceptable parenting skills, inadequate
living space, or insufficient income. s4 Often these decisions are made by a
lone caseworker with few years of child welfare experience and whose
decision is not closely scrutinized by others at the agency. 85 Few, if any,
states have established administrative processes to challenge erroneous
decision-making.86
In these and other cases, the child welfare agency in the receiving state
denied the proposed placement, despite a consensus among the parties and
the court in the sending state that the placement was in the child's best
interest. Again, the underlying reason for the high rate of denials is
unknown. Agencies may deny interstate home studies to prevent other
states from "dumping" foster children in their state. Agencies may simply
be overwhelmed and deny placements because they do not have the time to
conduct thorough investigations. Without any judicial oversight, there is
no legal mechanism to prevent agency overreaching. Lacking the authority
to examine the reasons behind the denials and to place children over the
objection of the receiving state, judges can only move the case forward by
83 id.
84 See, e.g., In re Emmanuel R., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 320, 323 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(contending that the placement request was denied based on "criminal record" and "past
history" with child welfare authorities); Dep't of Servs. for Children v. J.W., No. CK96-
04055, 2004 Del. Fain. Ct. LEXIS, at *142 (2004) (arguing that the denial was primarily
based on the fact that the father had more than two misdemeanor convictions); Adoption of
Leland, 842 N.E.2d 962, 966 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (discussing that the home study of a
father was denied because too many people lived in the home); Div. of Youth & Faro.
Servs. v. K.F., 803 A.2d 721, 725 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (contending that the
denial was based in part on the fact that the prior home was "cramped, cluttered and dirty"
even though the current residence met all of the relevant state standards).
85 See Out of Luck, supra note 2, at 66-67 (2006); see also Perpetuating Impermanence,
supra note 2, at 444.
86 See, e.g., ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL ISSUES AND COURT PROCEEDINGS IN INDIANA
INVOLVING OUT OF STATE PLACEMENTS 23 (June 2008), available at http://www.abanet.
org/child/rclji/placement-assessments/IN-icpcassessment.pdf (acknowledging that there is
no formal appeal process for ICPC denials); INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF
CHILDREN: MICHIGAN ASSESSMENT, supra note 79, at 15 (recommending that Michigan
adopt an appeals process for ICPC denials); N. DIANE GOUT & ANITA ST. ONGE,
MASSACHUSETTS ASSESSMENT OF EFFORTS RELATED TO THE INTERSTATE PLACEMENT OF
CHILDREN 21 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/child/rclji/placement_
assessments/MA icpcassessment.pdf (recommending the creation of a process to appeal
ICPC denials).
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trying to locate alternate placements for these children. Until then, the
children often remain in foster care indefinitely.
The experience over the past forty years demonstrates the need for
judicial oversight over the interstate placement process. Home studies are
not completed in a timely manner. Placements are denied at an
astonishingly high rate and for subjective reasons. No administrative
processes have been created to review poor agency decision-making, and
litigants have no avenues to prevent agency overreaching because court
review is prohibited. The next section presents an outline as to how
judicial oversight over the interstate placement of foster children can be
instituted and recommends that these reforms be implemented through
federal legislation because states have refused to address these problems.
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
A relatively straightforward proposal creating judicial oversight would
address the problems noted above while balancing a child's interest in
promptly resolving placement decisions with the need to access important
87information about the proposed placement to make a considered decision.
Under the reformed system, the child welfare agency in the sending state
would bear the responsibility of ensuring that private or public child
welfare agencies complete interstate home studies within thirty days of a
request. 88 Courts in the sending state would retain the sole authority to
make interstate placement decisions.89 Finally, if an interstate placement is
made, agencies in the sending state would have to arrange for a private or
public child welfare agency to monitor the placement.90 As is currently the
case under the Compact, the sending state would continue to maintain full
financial responsibility for the child and any services the child received
after the placement was made. 91
In practice, the system would work in the following way. When an
out-of-state placement is proposed for a child, the sending state would be
required to immediately arrange and pay for a home study to be completed
by either a private or public child welfare agency in the receiving state
87 A similar version of this reform proposal first appeared in Perpetuating
Impermanence, supra note 2, at 457.
8 Id. at 458.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See NEW ICPC, supra note 5, at art. V ("The sending agency shall continue to have
financial responsibility for support and maintenance of the child during the period of the
placement.").
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within thirty days of the request. The American Public Human Services
Association and federal law have endorsed a thirty-day time period as the
benchmark for how quickly home studies should be completed.92 The
home study must ascertain objective facts about the proposed caregiver and
his or her living situation similar to facts required in intrastate home
studies. For example, specific information about the caretaker's home,
past relationship with the child, criminal record, and any child protective
history would be particularly relevant. The caseworker conducting the
evaluation should include a statement about whether the potential
placement would violate any laws in the receiving state and may include a
recommendation about whether the placement would serve the child's best
interests.
Once completed, the home study would be transmitted to the court in
the sending state for a decision about whether the placement should be
made. The sending state court would retain the sole authority to decide
whether the child should be placed with the proposed caregiver unless the
placement would violate the child placement laws in the receiving state.
The procedures for making this decision would mirror those for intrastate
placement decisions, except the receiving state agency would be provided
notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard prior to the decision.93
The caseworker who drafted the home study could testify in the proceeding
by telephone if necessary. 94 The court would issue its decision after
considering the home study, any additional evidence, and arguments by the
92 See GUIDE TO THE ICPC, supra note 7, at 5 (recommending that the ICPC requests be
processed within 30 days); see also 42 U.S.C. § 673(g)(3) (2006) (defining a timely home
study as one completed within thirty days).
93 See AMERICAN PUBLIC HUMAN SERVICES ASSOCIATION, ICPC DEVELOPMENT AND
DRAFTING TEAM FIRST MEETING SUMMARY 8 (July 2004) (discussing how members of the
ICPC Development and Drafting Team recommended that judges be empowered with the
ultimate authority to make interstate placement decisions, even over the receiving state's
objection. "[I]t was the general consensus that the judge in the sending state should be able
to override a recommendation by the receiving state with regard to safety and suitability of
a placement based on the best interests of the child. The judge should also be able to rule
that an out-of-state parent is fit, and to close the case. However, the receiving state should
have a right to be heard in the case if the judge places the child in their state and intends to
keep the case open.").
94 The Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, which has been
adopted by over forty states, specifically authorizes courts to take testimony of out-of-state
witnesses by telephone. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANm. § 722.1111 (West 2002); N.C.
GEN. STAT. AN. § 50A-I 11 (West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-14.1-11 (2003).
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parties and the receiving state. Any party to the child protective
proceeding and the receiving state aggrieved with the court's placement
decision would have standing to appeal the decision in any manner
authorized by the law in the sending state.
If the sending state agency failed to arrange for the completion of the
home study within thirty days, then the individuals affected by the
noncompliance, including the child and the proposed caretaker, would
have standing to seek a judicial remedy in the sending state.95 Possible
compliance mechanisms could include a contempt finding, financial
penalties, or orders to reimburse private agencies to complete home
studies. Another form of equitable relief could include ordering the
interstate placement without a home study if the court possesses enough
information to make a determination about the placement of the child.
96
95 See Freundlich, supra note 2, at 51-52. Freundlich suggested that one approach to
enforce the ICPC would be to give standing to the child's foster parents, attorney, and/or
guardian ad litem in the sending state and to the prospective adoptive parent(s) in the
receiving state to file an action against the public child welfare agency in the receiving state
when there is inaction or administrative mismanagement. Id. at 52. "[T]he knowledge that
there is legal recourse on behalf of waiting children would create an additional incentive for
timely and quality determinations." Id.
96 The ultimate responsibility of dependency courts is to protect the best interests of the
child. As such, a number of courts have overlooked violations of the ICPC when the best
interests of the child warrant such a result. See, e.g., In re Christina M., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 52,
56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) ("We do not believe the Compact was meant to be applied so
inflexibly that emergency moves cannot be accommodated. The juvenile court has broad
discretion to decide what means will best serve the child's interest and to fashion a
dispositional order accordingly.") (internal quotation omitted); In re Adoption/Guardianship
No. 3598, 701 A.2d 110, 124 (Md. 1997) ("Certainly, the best interest of the child remains
the overarching consideration and the needs of the child should not be subordinate to
enforcement of the ICPC."); State v. K.F., 803 A.2d 721, 729 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2002) ("To view the ICPC as a set of rigid rules would circumvent its goals and the court's
ability to achieve those goals. The court's paramount duty in child welfare cases is to
protect the best interest of the children."); Florida v. Thornton, 396 S.E.2d 475, 481-82 (W.
Va. 1990) ("[W]e certainly do not mean to denigrate the ICPC or its importance. We
merely recognize that when the facts of a case.., compel the exercise ofourparenspatriae
duty to protect a child's best interests, that duty outweighs the competing interests of
abiding by a strict and uncompromising reverence to the Compact ...."). But see In the
Matter of Ryan R., 29 A.D.3d 806 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (reversing placement order which
sent children to their paternal aunt and uncle in violation of the ICPC); In the Matter of
Melinda D., 31 A.D.3d 24, 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) ("Well-intentioned efforts of law
guardians, placement agencies, and courts to match children with suitable foster care,
(continued)
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This last remedy may be applicable in many situations due to the ease at
which information relevant to evaluating a caretaker's parenting abilities,
such as previous criminal or child protective history, can be obtained
electronically. 97  Testimony by the potential caretakers at a placement
hearing conducted in the sending state could also yield enough information
to satisfy concerns the court may have regarding the placement.
98
After the placement is made, the sending state agency would arrange
for a private or public child welfare agency to monitor the placement and
provide periodic reports to the court with updates on the child's status. As
in the current system, the sending state would retain financial
responsibility for the child at all times prior to the closing of the case. The
child's need for expedited decisions about his permanency would trump
bureaucratic or financial obstacles created by state agencies.
States may resist this proposal for several reasons. It eliminates the
complete control that state agencies exercise over interstate placement
decisions. Under the ICPC, the local agency in the receiving state
possesses the exclusive authority to determine whether the child can be
placed in that state. Courts have been divested of any such authority. The
new reforms would strip the agency of that power and instead invest
sending state courts with the power to control placement decisions.
Although the proposal entitles the receiving state to notice and an
opportunity to be heard prior to the placement decision being made, the
agency would no longer control the process. However, as explained in the
first two sections of this paper, compelling reasons exist to transfer
decision-making authority from child welfare agencies to state courts.
Child welfare agencies may also claim that vesting decision-making
power with sending state courts would infringe upon the sovereignty of the
receiving state. The argument would be based on the notion that the
sending state court does not have jurisdiction to compel the receiving state
particularly for children whose placements are rendered more difficult by virtue of special
needs, must nevertheless comply with the procedural mandates of [the ICPC] to fully
protect the best interests of foster children.").
97 See Crystal A. v. Lisa B., 818 N.Y.S.2d 443, 445 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) ("Today, so
many records are computerized and the local New York State agency through computer
searches and telephone interviews can obtain almost as much information about the
interested relatives as the out-of-state agencies located where the relatives reside.").
98 See id. ("[Tlhe maternal grandfather and his wife traveled to present themselves to
this Court, voluntarily testified before the Court and subjected themselves to cross-
examination. All parties had an opportunity to judge the maternal grandfather's and his
wife's credibility and character in person.").
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agency to take any action. This concern, however, is misplaced because
under the proposal, the sending state court would not be issuing orders that
bind the receiving state agency in any way. Throughout the entire process,
the sending state would be responsible for the child's placement and the
court would only be issuing orders that compel the sending state agency to
take certain steps. The sending state agency would bear the responsibility
of arranging for the timely completion of the home study. If an interstate
placement was made pursuant to a court order, the order would simply
require the sending state agency to place the child with a caretaker in
another state. The interstate placement would be consistent with federal
law, which mandates the elimination of barriers to inter-jurisdictional
placements,99 and the Constitution, which protects individuals' right to
travel.'0° The complete financial responsibility for the child would remain
with the sending state unless the two states reached a separate
agreement.' 01 If they did not reach such an agreement, the sending state
would retain full financial responsibility for the child's maintenance. The
sending state court would not impose any additional obligations on the
receiving state agency.
Finally, child welfare agencies may argue that the proper solution to
this problem is to afford aggrieved caretakers an administrative hearing in
the receiving state rather than provide courts with the authority to make the
final decision. This solution is impractical for many reasons. First, relying
on administrative hearings in the receiving state would place the burden on
the caretakers to address erroneous denials because all the parties in the
case, including the child's advocate, would be in the sending state. These
99 See, e.g., Safe and Timely Interstate Placement of Foster Children Act of 2006 § 10,
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (2006) (advocating for interstate child placements where doing
so is in the best interests of the child); Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003 §
204, 42 U.S.C. § 5114 (mandating findings assessing interjurisdictional child placements
and recommendations for future reform).
104 See, e.g., Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974) ("The right of
interstate travel has repeatedly been recognized as a basic constitutional freedom."); United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966) ("Although there have been recurring differences
in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel,
there is no need here to canvass those differences further. All have agreed that the right
exists.").
101 See NEW ICPC, supra note 5, at art. V ("When the sending agency is a public
agency, it may enter into an agreement with an authorized public or private agency in the
receiving state providing for the performance of one or more services in respect of such
case by the latter as agency for the sending agency.").
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caretakers would likely lack representation and the sophistication
necessary to navigate a complex system without a lawyer. This would
create a high likelihood that erroneous denials would go unchallenged. If
the decision rested with the sending state court, then a number of parties,
most of whom would be represented by attorneys, could bring the issue to
the court's attention and fully litigate it.
Second, the administrative hearing process would add considerable
delays to finalizing a permanent placement for the child due to the length
of time it typically takes to obtain a hearing and decision. For example,
under most state administrative procedures acts, no specific timeframes
exist as to how quickly hearings must be held. 0 2 As a practical matter,
evidence suggests that it takes several months to get an administrative
hearing, if not longer. 10 3 After the administrative decision is made, that
decision could be appealed to a trial court, whose decision could be
appealed to appellate courts. 104 Thus, if this process was adopted to review
interstate placement denials, then a child would remain in limbo for
months, not knowing whether he or she was going to live with the
caregiver in another state or move elsewhere. In contrast, courts have the
flexibility to convene emergency hearings at any point to address
immediate problems that arise in a child protective case, and thus, could
resolve the placement issue in an expeditious and efficient matter.
Finally, reliance on an administrative process in the receiving state
would significantly increase the chance of a poor, incomplete placement
decision. Any placement decision in a child welfare case involves a
balancing of harms. The decision-maker must compare the strengths and
102 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.51 (West 2005) (imposing no timing requirements
on a judge for the scheduling of an administrative hearing); N.Y. A. P. A. § 301 (McKinney
2003) (requiring only that administrative hearings occur within a reasonable time period);
TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.051 (Vernon 2008) (setting no specific time for the
scheduling of an administrative hearing by the administrative judge).
103 See, e.g., Joseph Grodin, Toward a Wrongful Termination Statute for California, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 135, 151 (1990) (highlighting the delays that accompany the general
administrative hearing and judicial review process); Ann Wise, Louisiana's Division of
Administrative Law: An Independent Administrative Hearings Tribunal, 68 LA. L. REv.
1169, 1196-97 (2008) (discussing the delays that can accompany the scheduling of an
administrative hearing).
104 A number of states provide for judicial review over administrative court decisions.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.68 (West 2008); MD. CODE. ANN., STATE GOv'T § 10-222
(LexisNexis 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.69 (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46
(2001); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.171 (Vernon 2008).
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weaknesses of the proposed placement with the child's current living
situation. For example, the decision of whether to place a child in another
state could depend on the child's living situation in the sending state, his or
her special needs, the prospects of reunification, and countless other
factors. To formulate an accurate determination, the decision-maker needs
comprehensive information about the child from both states.
An administrative hearing process in the receiving state would not be
conducive to this type of reasoned deliberation. The administrative
hearing officer would be new to the case and know nothing about the child.
Thus, to assess whether the placement should be made, the officer has to
attain the same level of understanding of the case as the sending state
juvenile court judge. Most, if not all, of the parties with substantive
knowledge of the child's life, however, would be in the sending state. This
would include the child's parents, social worker, guardian ad litem, and
other service providers. These actors may lack standing to appear and
participate in the administrative hearing. Even if that issue was resolved,
logistical impediments, including the distance between the two forums,
would make it difficult for them to effectively participate in the hearing
and educate the hearing officer about the different considerations that must
be taken into account. The hearing officer would likely base his or her
decision on limited facts presented by the receiving state caseworker and
the pro se caretaker.
These problems would be avoided if decision-making rested with the
sending state court judge, who, as the judge responsible for the child's
case, already possesses a comprehensive understanding of the child's
situation. The only information the judge would need to make a placement
decision would be the home study completed by the caseworker in the
receiving state, along with the testimony of the caretaker who may wish to
dispute findings in the home study. With this limited information, the
judge would be in the best position to balance the harms implicated by the
potential placement. Retaining the authority to make placement decisions
with the juvenile judge in the sending state eliminates the need to educate
another fact-finder about the complex dynamics in the child's life, which
for the aforementioned reasons is unlikely to happen if the decision rests
with an administrative hearing officer in the receiving state.
V. CONCLUSION
Implementing judicial oversight over the interstate placement process
is the only way to insure that the interests of children to remain with their
families are prioritized, which unfortunately has not occurred in the current
system. The failure of states to remedy this problem over the past forty
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years and the inadequacy of their current proposal to reform the Compact
suggest that federal intervention is necessary. Such intervention would be
consistent with the federal government's interests in addressing problems
of a national scope beyond the capacity of individual states to solve. It
would also serve the government's interest in expediting the permanency
of foster children, which has already resulted in numerous federal
mandates on state child welfare systems. The increasing numbers of
interstate placement requests only underscores the need for immediate
reform.
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